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Abstract: This paper investigates the pricing of patented traits in the U.S. hybrid corn seed 
market under imperfect competition. In a multiproduct context, we first examine how 
substitution/complementarity relationships among products can affect pricing. This is used to 
motivate multi-product generalizations of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (GHHI) capturing 
cross-market effects of imperfect competition on bundle pricing. The GHHI model is applied 
to pricing of conventional and patented biotech seeds in the US from 2000-2007. One major 
finding is that standard component pricing in biotech traits is soundly rejected in favor of 
subadditive bundle pricing. The econometric estimates show how changes in market 
structures (as measured by both own- and cross-Herfindahl indexes) affect U.S. corn seed 
prices.  
    
Key Words: Component pricing, imperfect competition, seed, biotechnology 
 
JEL Code: L13, L4, L65  
                                                 
1 Respectively Assistant Professor, Professor and Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI. This research was funded in part by USDA-
NRI grant #144-QS50.   1
The U.S. agricultural biotechnology and seed industries have experienced many changes over the 
last few decades. On the one hand, new seeds including biotech patented traits offer new 
prospects for increasing agricultural productivity. This has stimulated a rapid adoption of biotech 
seeds in the U.S. for corn, soybean and cotton. On the other hand, mergers and acquisitions in the 
seed industry have resulted in concentrated seed markets dominated by a few large biotech firms. 
This has raised some concern that market power and imperfect competition could lead biotech 
firms to charge high prices for the biotech seeds, with potential adverse effects on farmers’ 
welfare. Biotechnology and genetic modifications have also stimulated product differentiation 
with patented traits being bundled with basic seed germplasm. Evaluating the pricing of such 
products under imperfect competition presents several challenges. One challenge is to evaluate 
the cross-markets impacts of market power under product differentiation. Another challenge is 
the empirical assessment of the pricing of bundled traits in biotech seed. A lack of available data 
has severely limited such investigations in previous research.
1  
This paper addresses these challenges with a focus on the analysis of the pricing of 
patented traits in the U.S. corn seed market. It makes three important contributions. First, we 
develop a pricing model of differentiated products under a quantity-setting game. In a 
multiproduct context, we show the linkages between pricing and substitution/complementarity 
relationships among products with different bundled characteristics. This is used to motivate 
multi-product generalizations of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (hereafter GHHI), which 
capture cross-market effects of imperfect competition on bundle pricing. Second, the GHHIs are 
introduced in an econometric analysis of the determinants of bundle pricing. To our knowledge, 
this is the first econometric investigation using GHHI to estimate the linkages between imperfect 
                                                 
1 In contrast, there is a rich body of analytical literature on bundle theory (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976, 
McAfee et al. 1989, Fang and Norman 2006).    2
competition and multiproduct pricing. The model also allows for a test of standard component 
pricing (where the price of bundle is the sum of the prices of each individual component within 
the bundle). Third, we present an empirical application to the U.S. hybrid corn seed market using 
extensive survey data. The econometric estimates provide useful information on interactions 
between bundling and the exercise of market power.   
Genetically modified (GM) corn acres account for about 80 percent of the total U.S. corn 
acreage in 2007. GM corn seed includes patented genetic traits (such as insect resistance and/or 
herbicide tolerance) patented by biotech firms. These traits can be introduced into the seed either 
separately, or bundled together when multiple genetic traits are “stacked”. The proportion of 
U.S. corn acres planted with stacked seeds has gone from 2.1 percent in 2000 to 56.2 percent in 
2007. Also, there has been a sharp increase in the number of traits being bundled. Single-trait 
GM corn seed was first commercialized in 1996. Two years later the double-stacked corn seed 
(i.e., the bundling of two traits) was introduced, followed by the introduction of the triple-stacked 
system, and then the quadruple-stacked system in around 2006. Moreover, corn seed with eight 
traits is expected to be released by Monsanto and Dow AgroScience by 2010.  
The increased use of GM corn seeds has been associated with changing structure in the 
U.S. seed markets. After a flurry of horizontal and vertical mergers in the 1990s, the corn seed 
industry is now dominated by a few large biotech firms (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). According to 
Graff, Rausser and Small (2003), these mergers have been motivated in part by the 
complementarities of assets within and between the agricultural biotechnology and seed 
industries. This indicates that trait bundling can be associated with cost reductions obtained from 
capturing economies of scope in the production of genetic traits. But bundling can also be part of 
a product differentiation strategy and price discrimination scheme intended to extract more profit   3
from farmers facing varying agro-climatic conditions. In this context, increased market 
concentration has raised concerns about adverse effects of imperfectly competitive pricing and 
the strategic use of bundling (Fulton and Giannakas 2001; Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). These 
issues suggest a need to investigate empirically the economics of pricing of hybrid corn seeds.   
Our econometric analysis quantifies the linkages between different combinations of traits, 
changes in market concentrations, and hybrid corn seed pricing. For bundled biotech traits, we 
reject standard component pricing of biotech traits. We find strong evidence of subadditive 
bundle pricing, which is consistent with price discrimination strategies and scope economies in 
the production of bundle-traited seeds. The analysis evaluates the interactive role of market 
concentrations and complementarity/substitution in demand. We document the linkages between 
traditional and cross-market concentrations and seed prices. This is done by estimating Lerner 
indexes, which provide useful information on departures from marginal cost pricing. Our 
analysis also illustrates how changing market structures (e.g., from mergers) relate to seed prices.  
The paper is organized as follows. The model section presents a conceptual framework of 
multiproduct pricing under imperfect competition. We then provide an overview of the U.S. corn 
seed market, followed by an econometric model of seed pricing, where the GHHIs reflect the 
exercise of market power. The estimation method and econometric results are then discussed and 
the empirical findings and their implications are reported. The conclusion section is at the last.   
 
The Model 
Consider a market involving a set  {1,..., } N = N of N firms producing a set  {1, ..., } T = T of T 
outputs. Denote by  1 ( ,..., ,..., )
nnn nT
mT yyyy + ≡∈ ℜ  the vector of outputs produced by the n-th firm, 
n
m y  being the m-th output produced by the n-th firm, m ∈ T, n ∈ N. The price-dependent demand   4
for the m-th output is ()
n
m n py
∈ ∑ N . The profit of the n-th firm is: 
[( )] () ,
nn n
mm n mn py y C y
∈∈− ∑∑ TN  where  ()
n
n Cydenotes the n-th firm’s cost of producing
n y . 
Assuming a Cournot game and under differentiability, the profit maximizing decision of the n-th 
firm for the m-th output 
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Equation (1c) is the complementary slackness condition. It applies whether the m-th 
output is produced by the n-th firm (
n
m y  > 0) or not (
n
m y  = 0). This is important for our analysis: 
(1c) remains valid irrespective of the firm entry/exit decision in the industry; and for an active 
firm, (1c) holds no matter how many of the T products the firm chooses to sell.  
Below, we consider the case of linear demands where  ()
n
kk k m m mn py αα
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j Sj y =∈ > T  is the set of positive outputs produced by the n-
th firm. Here,  ()
n
n F S ≥ 0 denotes fixed cost that satisfies  () n F ∅  = 0.  And 
n
mm m cy
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∂ = , m ∈ T for all n ∈ N.  Note that the 
presence of fixed cost (where  ( )
n
n F S  > 0 for 
n S ≠ ∅) implies increasing returns to scale. In this 
situation, marginal cost pricing would imply negative profit and any sustainable equilibrium 
must be associated with departures from marginal cost pricing. Fixed cost can also capture the 
presence of economies of scope. This would occur when  () () ( ) ab nnn a b FFF + >∪ TTT T  for some   5
Ta ⊂ T and Tb ⊂ T, i.e. when the joint production of outputs 
n
a y  = { : } a
n
j yj ∈T  and 
n
b y  = 
{: } b
n
j yj ∈T  reduces fixed cost (Baumol et al., 1982, p. 75). A relevant example is the case of an 
R&D investment contributing to the joint production of 
n
a y  and 
n
b y .  
Assuming that the aggregate output of the m-th product is positive,  0
n
mm n Yy






m Y s =∈  as the market share of the n-th firm for the m-th product. Dividing equation 
(1c) by  m Y  and summing across all n ∈ N yield 
()
nn
mm k m k m k kn pc s s Y α
∈∈ =− ∑∑ TN , (2) 
which can be alternatively written as 
mm k m k m k k pc H Y α
∈ =− ∑ T , (3) 
where  k Y  is the aggregate output of the k-th product, and ,
nn
km k m n H ss
∈ ≡∑ N  with m, k ∈ T.  
Equation (3) is a pricing equation for the m-th product. It is a structural equation in the 
sense that both price  m p  and the market shares in the  km H ’s are endogenous (as they are both 
influenced by firms’ strategies). Yet, equation (3) provides useful linkages between price and 
market structure. It shows that the exercise of market power in (3) is given by  
mk m k m k k M HY α
∈ =−∑ T , (4) 
which reflects departures from marginal cost pricing. A simple way to characterize this departure 





− = , where cm is marginal cost. The Lerner index m L  
measures the proportion by which the m-th output price exceeds marginal cost. It is zero under 
marginal cost pricing, but positive when price exceeds marginal cost. The Lerner index provides 
a simple characterization of the strength of imperfect competition (where the firm has market 
power and its decisions affect market prices). From equations (3) and (4), the Lerner index can   6




m p L = . This makes it clear that Mm in (4) gives a per-unit measure of price 
enhancement beyond marginal cost. Equation (4) also provides useful information on the 
structural determinants of Mm. Indeed, while km H  ∈ [0, 1], note that  km H  → 0 under perfect 
competition (where the number of active firms is large) and  km H = 1 under monopoly (where 
there is single active firm). In other words, the term Mm in (4) captures the effects of imperfect 
competition and the exercise of market power on prices.  
When k = m, note that  mm H  is the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
providing a measure of market concentration. The HHI is commonly used in the analysis of the 
exercise of market power (e.g., Whinston 2008). Given  0, mm α <  equation (3) indicates that an 
increase in the HHI  mm H  (simulating an increase in market power) is associated with an increase 
in the Lerner index  m L  and in price  m p . As a rule of thumb, regulatory agencies have considered 
that  0.1 mm H >  corresponds to concentrated markets where the exercise of market power can 
potentially raise competitive concerns (e.g., Whinston 2008).
2  
Equation (3) extends the HHI to a multiproduct context. It defines  km H  as a generalized 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (GHHI). When k ≠ m, it shows that a rise in the “cross-market” 
GHHI  km H  would be associated with an increase (a decrease) in the Lerner index  m L  and in the 
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∂ =  < 0 (> 0) when products k and m are substitutes (complements) 
                                                 
2 The markets shares are often expressed in percentage term in the calculation of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. Then, the rule becomes Hmm > 1000 (Whinston 2008).     7
on the demand side, corresponding to situations where increasing 
n
m y  tends to decrease (increase) 
the marginal value of
n
k y . The terms { km H : k ≠  m} in equation (3) show how the nature of 
substitution or complementarity among outputs on the demand side (through the terms km α ) 
influences the effects of market concentration on the Lerner index and prices
3: a rise in  km H  
would be associated with an increase (a decrease) in the Lerner index  m L  and in the price  m p  
when  k y and  m y  are substitutes (complements).  
Note that equation (3) applies to general multiproduct pricing in a Cournot game under 
imperfect competition. It includes as a special case the pricing of bundled goods differentiated by 
their characteristics. In a way consistent with previous research (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; 
Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003; Fang and Norman 2006), it shows that the exercise of market 
power in bundling and bundle pricing can be complex. This indicates a need to assess 
empirically how the bundling of product characteristics interacts with market structures to affect 
pricing. This issue is explored next in the context of the U.S. corn seed market.  
 
The U.S. Corn Seed Market 
Our analysis relies on a large, extensive data set providing detailed information on the U.S. corn 
seed market. The data were collected by dmrkynetec [hereafter dmrk]. The dmrk data come 
from a stratified sample of U.S. corn farmers surveyed annually from 2000 to 2007.
4 The survey 
provides farm-level information on corn seed purchases, corn acreage, seed types and seed 
                                                 
3  Our model provides a more general framework in analyzing the role played by substitution/ 
complementarity in multiproduct pricing under imperfect competition than Venkatesh and Kamakura 
(2003), who investigate such issues only in a monopolistic setup. 
4  Data prior to 2000 is not available from dmrk. The survey is stratified to over-sample producers with 
large acreage. The sampling weights are constructed using the farm census data.    8
prices. It was collected using computer assisted telephone interviews. On average about 40-50% 
of the farms surveyed each year remain in the sample for the next year. For 2000-2007, the dmrk 
data contains 168,862 observations on individual corn seed purchases from 279 USDA crop 
reporting districts (CRD)
5 in 48 states.  A total of 38,617 farms were surveyed during 2000-2007, 
with each farm on average purchasing four to five different corn seed each year.
6 
Since farmers typically buy their seeds locally, our analysis defines the “local market” at 
the CRD level. To guarantee reliable measurement of market concentrations, we focus our 
analysis on those CRDs in the slightly expanded Corn Belt regions with more than ten farms 
sampled every year between 2000 and 2007.  In total, our data contain 139,410 observations 
from 80 CRDs in 12 states.
8   
  Starting in the 1930s, the development and diffusion of hybrid corn transformed the U.S. 
seed industry and contributed to the dominant role played by private seed companies. The dmrk 
data show that about 300 seed companies operate in the current U.S. corn seed market. However, 
only six biotech firms are involved,
9 four of which own subsidiary corn seed companies.
10   
Currently there are two major groups of genes/traits in the GM seed market: insecticide 
resistance designed to reduce yield damages caused by insects; and herbicide tolerance designed 
to reduce yield reductions from competing plants (weeds).  For corn, the insect resistance traits 
                                                 
5  A crop-reporting district (CRD) is defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to reflect local agro-
climatic conditions.  In general, a CRD is larger than a county but smaller than a state.   
6  Due to the fast turnover in the seed market, farmers may try new hybrid seeds every year, thus would 
purchase more than one hybrid seed type for their field. In addition, the U.S. EPA requires that farmers 
maintain at least 20 percent of their cropland for “non-insect resistant” hybrid seeds. 
8 They are:  IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, MI, MN, MO, NE, OH, SD, and WI. 
9  They are: Monsanto, Syngenta, Dow AgroSciences, DuPont, Bayer CropScience, and BASF. 
10 While one of the rest two firms has already entered the cotton seed market, the dmrk data show that it 
has not entered (yet) the U.S. corn seed market.  
Deleted: On average each farm 
purchased four to five different seeds 
each year
7.   9
focus on controlling damages caused by two insects: the European corn borer (ECB),
11 and 
rootworms (RW).
12 The herbicide tolerance (HT) traits work with corresponding herbicides.  
After adopting the HT traited seed technology, farmers can apply the relevant herbicide to the 
field, which kills the weeds without damaging the traited crop. Some biotech seeds contain only 
one of these traits, while the bundled seeds contain multiple traits from some combination of the 
two groups of traits. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of corn acreage shares reflecting adoption rates in the US 
from 2000 to 2007, for conventional seed, single-trait biotech seed, double-stacking biotech seed, 
triple-stacking biotech seed, and quadruple-stacking biotech seed. The conventional seed’s 
acreage share has decreased rapidly over the past eight years: from 67.5% in 2000 to 20.6% in 
2007.  Table 1 illustrates the average price of different hybrid corn seeds ($ per bag) from 2000 
to 2007. It indicates that biotech traits tend to add value to the conventional germplasm, and that 
multiple stacking/bundling is worth more than single stacking.  The information presented in 
figure 1 and table 1 is at the national level, which masks important spatial market differences. 
For example, while single-trait biotech seeds had a U.S. market share of 30% in 2000, the dmrk 
data show that conventional seeds still dominated many local markets. And while the U.S. 
conventional seed’s market share was 20.6% in 2007, some local markets were completely 
dominated by biotech seeds. This indicates the presence of spatial heterogeneity in the U.S. corn 
seed market. As shown below, such heterogeneity also applies to seed prices. 
                                                 
11 The European corn borer is a major pest of corn in North America and Europe. Yield loss due to ECB 
has been estimated to average about five percent, although damages can vary widely both over time and 
over space.  
12  Yield loss due to corn rootworms damages average around five percent in the US, amounting to about 
$800 million of reduced income for U.S. corn growers.    10
Figure 1.  Percentage of U.S. Acreage Planted in Conventional and GM corn seed , 2000 – 
2007. 
 
Table 1. Average price for different seeds ($ per bag), 2000 - 2007 
Year Conventional  ECB Single  RW Single  HT Single  Double  Triple  Quadruple 
2000  79.37 100.24  n/a  87.34  95.21 100.95  n/a 
2001  80.73  103.77 n/a  89.85  100.43  105.29 n/a 
2002  81.81 103.91  n/a  89.08 103.19 94.64  n/a 
2003  83.79 104.93  114.88 94.73 108.78 82.10  n/a 
2004  86.42 108.61  120.49 98.88 113.68  112.21  n/a 
2005  86.96  104.46 114.52 101.50 114.49 123.78  n/a 
2006  91.36  109.69 116.67 109.93 123.03 139.21 131.29 
2007  93.53  111.36 121.07 114.67 124.71 133.02 140.03 
Total  84.29  105.37 117.33 101.51 118.25 133.47 139.60 
 
Econometric Specification 
Our analysis of the determinants of corn seed prices builds on equation (3). As derived, equation 
(3) is a structural equation reflecting the determinants of pricing under imperfect competition in a 
multi-product framework. As discussed in the model section, fixed cost can generate economies 
of scope. Economies of scope are relevant here as R&D investment likely generates synergies in   11
the production of bundled/stacked seeds. This would in turn affect bundle pricing. Also, the 
effects of imperfect competition on price can be expected to depend on the nature of 
substitution/complementarity across bundles.  Below, we specify a modified version of (3) that 
reflects the effects of both bundling and market power on corn seed price.     
Consider for the case of seeds exhibiting different genetic characteristics. Partition the set 
of seeds into mutually exclusive types. Let Ki ∈ {0, 1} be a dummy variable for a seed of the i-th 
type, i = 1, ….J. Let  1 i =  characterize conventional seed, and let  {2,..., } J ≡ Q  denote the set of 
genetic traits associated with biotech seeds. Thus,  1 1 K =  for conventional seeds. Each biotech 
seed includes at least one genetic trait in the set Q, with  1 i K =  if the seed includes the genetic 
traits of the i-th type either individually or stacked with other traits,  , i∈Q  and 0 i K = otherwise. 





= = ∑  However, in the presence of stacking, some biotech seeds may include the 




= ≥ ∑  Therefore, evaluating the effects 
of the genetic characteristics on seed prices requires a flexible specification that can capture 
bundling/stacking effects.   
We start with a standard model in which each purchase observation is at the farm-level 
and the price of a seed varies with its characteristics (e.g., following Rosen 1974). The price p 
represents the net seed price paid by farmers (in $ per bag).
13 Consider the hedonic equation 
representing the determinants of the price p for a seed of characteristics  12 {, , . . . , } : J KK K   
{1,..., }
, i i ij ij ijz ijz ijzr ijzr
i J ji zji rzji
ji z jji rzz jji
pK K K K β δδ δ δ ε
∈∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
>> > > > >
=+ + + + + + ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑∑ ∑∑∑∑
QQ QQQ QQQQ
φX  (5a) 
                                                 
13  We also estimated a log specification of the price equation. The econometric results were qualitatively 
similar to the ones reported below.    12
where X is a vector of other relevant covariates, and ε is an error term with mean zero and 
constant variance. In equation (5a),  ij K  is a dummy variable for double-stacking the i-th and j-th 
genetic type. Similarly, ijz K and ijzr K  are dummy variables representing respectively triple-
stacking and quadruple-stacking.
14    
  For conventional seeds and single-trait seeds, the dummy variables  , ij K ijz K  and  ijzr K  are 
all zero. This implies that the coefficients  , ij δ   , ijz δ  and  ijzr δ  in (5a) capture the effects of 
bundling on seed price. The dmrk data reveal that trait bundling is common, which allows us to 
test for its price impacts. One important special case occurs when  0 ij ijz ijzr δ δδ = == ,  which 
corresponds to standard component pricing.  Here, the price of seed is just the sum of the value 
of its genetic components (as captured by∑i i iK δ , with i δ  measuring the unit value of the i-th 
genetic material). When the parameters  , ij δ   , ijz δ  and  ijzr δ  are not all zero, equation (5a) allows 
for non-linear pricing associated with bundled goods under stacking.  
In general, the parameters  , ij δ   , ijz δ  and  ijzr δ  can be either positive or negative. When 
positive, these parameters would reflect super-additive bundle pricing. This could occur when 
component demands are complementary, i.e., when adding a trait to an existing trait system 
increases consumer’s valuation for the stacked system more than the marginal value of the 
additional trait. Alternatively, negative parameters would correspond to sub-additive bundle 
pricing. The price of bundled goods would then be “discounted” compared to component pricing. 
                                                 
14 Note that the K’s in (5a) satisfy
{1,..., }
23 1 i ij ijz ijzr
iJ j i z j i r z j i
ji z jji rzz jji
KK K K
∈∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
>> > > > >
−− − = ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑∑ ∑∑∑∑
QQ QQQ QQQQ
, 
implying that they are perfectly collinear with the intercept. To deal with this issue below, we set δ1 = 0 
in (5a), meaning that the intercept reflects the price of conventional seeds and that the other δ 
parameters measure price differences relative to conventional seeds.   13
This could happen under two scenarios. First, this could be associated with economies of scope 
on the production side, if the joint production of bundled goods leads to a cost reduction that gets 
translated into lower bundle price. Second, this could be associated with price discrimination on 
the demand side, if discounting the price of a bundled good can help increase firm profit. In 
general, equation (5a) provides a framework to analyze the nature of bundle pricing.  
Next, as shown in equation (3), we introduce market power effects in (5a) by specifying 
  0 , ii i i i i H δ δδ =+    (5b) 
where
nn
ii i i n H ss
∈ ≡∑ N  is the HHI (
n
i s being the market share of the n-th firm in the market for 
the i-th seed type) measuring market concentration in the i-th market. We further specify  
0 ij ij i ji ji j
ji ji
ji ji
H KH K ββ β β
∈∈ ∈∈
>>
=+ + ∑∑ ∑∑
QQ QQ
,   (5c) 
where
nn






 being the cross-market GHHI discussed in the model section and 
measuring concentration for firms operating in the market for both i-th and j-th characteristics. 
With this specification, the coefficient of the traditional HHI,  0 ii δ ≠ , would reflect market 
power related to the i-th characteristic, while the coefficient of the GHHI, 0 ij β ≠  or  0 ji β ≠ , 
would reflect the exercise of market power across characteristics.  
Since the HHI and the GHHI’s are zero under competitive conditions, it follows from 
equations (4) and (5a)-(5c) that the effect of market power on price is given by 
1
{1,..., }
i ii i ij ij i ji ji j
i J ji ji
ji ji
M HK HK HK δββ
∈∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
>>
=++ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
QQ QQ
. (6) 
In a way similar to equation (4), equation (6) provides a representation of the linkages 
between imperfect competition and pricing. As noted in the model section, the term M in (6) 
measures the difference between price and marginal cost. It can be used to obtain the associated   14
Lerner index L =  M
p . When positive, M reflects the price enhancement associated with imperfect 
competition.     
Our analysis is based on five seed characteristics (J = 5): Conventional  1 (1 ) ; K =  insect 
resistance trait ECB  2 (1 ) ; K = insect resistance trait RW  3 (1 ) ; K =  herbicide tolerance trait HT1 
4 (1 ) ; K =  and herbicide tolerance trait HT2  5 (1 ) . K =  Note that this distinguishes between two 
types of herbicide tolerance: HT1 and HT2. The reason is that, in our sample, HT1 and HT2 are 
sometimes stacked/bundled together. This implies that farmers see HT1 and HT2 as being 
different (otherwise, no farmer would pay extra for a second herbicide tolerant technology).  
Our model specification allows us to estimate the pricing of each seed type along with 
stacking/bundling effects. To illustrate, from (5a)-(5c), the price equation for conventional seed 
1 (1 ) K =  is  
5




pH H β δδ β ε
=
=++ + + + ∑ φX  (7a) 
For a seed marketed with a single ECB trait (K2 = 1), the price equation becomes   
5




pH H H β δδ ββ ε
=
=++ + + + ⋅ + ∑ φ X  (7b) 
And for a double-stacking seed with an insect resistance trait (ECB) and our first herbicide 
tolerance trait (HT1)  24 2 4 (1 ,1 ,  a n d   1 ) KK K == = , the price equation is 
35




pH H H H H H β δδδδ δ βββ β ε
==
=++++ + + + + + ++ ∑∑ φX .  (7c) 
Comparing equations (7b)-(7c) reveals how our model captures price differences between 
single-trait seed and bundled/stacked seeds. It shows how both stacking and market 
concentration affect pricing. Equation (7c) contains all the dummy variables reflecting   15
stacking/bundling of traits along with their interaction effects with the traditional HHI’s: Hii. It 
also contains the parameters linking price to the generalized cross market GHHI’s: Hij, i ≠ j. Note 
that market share information is contained in both the traditional and cross Herfindahl indexes. 
This means that the effects of market concentration and imperfect competition on prices are 
complex. Evaluating these effects will be addressed in the implications section.   
The relevant covariates in X include location, a time trend, each farm’s total corn 
acreage, and binary terms covering the range of how each purchase was sourced. Location is 
represented by state dummy variables, along with the longitude and latitude of the county where 
the farm is located. These variables capture spatial heterogeneity in farming systems and agro-
climatic conditions (including the length of the growing season). The latitude and longitude 
variables are specified in both linear and quadratic forms, reflecting possible non-linearity in 
their effects. For example, according to Griliches (1960), the corn seed industry first developed 
new hybrids that were best adapted to land in the center of the Corn Belt due to profitability 
consideration. It is likely that the same path is followed in the biotech seed development, which 
may result in a significant difference in seed prices between the center and fringe regions. The 
time trend is included to capture the advances in hybrid and genetic technology through the years 
of the study. Farm acreage captures possible price discrimination effects related to farm size. 
While there are a total of 16 different purchasing sources, most seeds are purchased through 
“Farmer who is a dealer or agent” (33.1%), followed by “Direct from seed company or their 
representatives” (29%), and “Myself, I am a dealer for that company” (16.1%). Note that a 
farmer may choose multiple sources to buy his seeds. Including source of purchase as an 
explanatory variable in (5a) captures possible price discrimination schemes affecting the seed 
price paid by farmers.     16
The market share of biotech seeds has increased significantly during the years of our 
study (see figure 1).  In many cases, we found “entry” and “exit” of traited seeds in some local 
markets. In order to investigate whether entry/exit may affect seed prices beyond the H effects, 
we also introduce entry/exit variables in the specification (5a). In our data, we observe local exits 
in the conventional seed ( 1 K ) markets. We also observe local entry in the HT1 trait ( 4 K ) 
markets, the ECB trait ( 2 K ) markets and the RW trait ( 3 K ) markets. To capture entry-exit effects 
on seed price, the following binary terms are included: Post-exit1 = 1, when  11 0; H = Pre-entry2 




Table 2 reports summary statistics of key variables used in the analysis.  The mean values of 
Hii’s show that the conventional seed markets are quite concentrated, but are considerably less 
concentrated than the biotech trait markets. Each CRD is presumed to represent the relevant 
market area for each transaction; thus, all H terms are calculated at that level.  Conducting 
market concentration analysis at the CRD level allows us to evaluate the possibility that seed 
companies recognize localized market power for seeds with favorable performance parameters 
under various agro-climatic conditions.  For the 80 CRDs covering the eight years of our data, 
the average conventional seed HHI is 0.242, which is well above the Department of Justice’s 
threshold of 0.18 for identifying "significant market power".  The average HHI for the three 
biotech seeds markets is over 0.80.  
                                                 
15 Note that we do not construct an event dummy for  5, K  as we do not observe any pattern of entry or 
exit for this trait.   17
One econometric issue in the specification (5a)-(5c) is the endogeneity of the H’s. Both 
market concentrations (as measured by the H’s) and seed pricing can be expected to be jointly 
determined as they both depend on firm strategies in the seed market. To the extent that parts of 
the determinants of these strategies are unobserved by the econometrician, this would imply that 
the H’s are correlated with the error term in equation (5a). In such situations, least-squares 
estimation of (5a)-(5c) would yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates (due to 
endogeneity bias). The solution is to consider estimating equation (5a)-(5c) using an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation method that corrects for endogeneity bias. To address this issue, we first 
test for possible endogeneity of the H’s using a C statistic calculated as the difference of two 
Sargan statistics (Hayashi 2000, p. 232). Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the H’s, the 
C statistic is distributed as Chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables 
tested. The test is robust to violations of the conditional homoscedasticity assumption (Hayashi 
2000, p. 232).
16 In our case, the C statistic is 200.16, showing strong statistical evidence against 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the H’s.  
The presence of endogeneity motivates the use of an instrumental variable (IV) estimator. 
We used the lagged value of each H and the lagged value of the market size for each trait 
(including the conventional seed) as instruments. The use of lagged values reflects the time 
required to grow the seeds, as seed companies typically make production decisions a year ahead 
of the marketing decisions. Indeed these lag values are part of the information set available to the 
seed companies at the time of their production decisions. The Hansen over-identification test is 
not statistically significant, indicating that our instruments appear to satisfy the required 
                                                 
16 Under conditional homoskedasticity, the C statistic is numerically equivalent to a Hausman test 
statistic.   18
orthogonality conditions. On that basis, equation (5a)-(5c) was estimated by two-stage-least-
square (2SLS). Further evaluation of these instruments is presented below.    
Table 2. Summary statistics 
a/
 The data contain 139410 observations from  CRDs spanning 8 years (2000-2007). Each farm purchases multiple 
seeds, therefore the number of observations for farm size is the total count of farms per year. The longitude and 
latitude information is based on the county level measurement for each farm.  
b/
 For the market concentration measurements H’s, we only report the summary statistics of those non zeros at the 
CRD level, therefore the number of observations is at most 80× 8 = 640. 
 
A second pretest was to evaluate the model for the effects on prices from unobserved 
heterogeneity across farms (e.g., unobserved pest populations). A Pagan-Hall test
17 found strong 
evidence against homoscedasticity of the error term in (5a). As reported earlier, each farm 
purchases on average four to five different seeds. Some large farms actually purchase up to 30 
different hybrid seeds in a single year. Unobserved farm-specific factors affecting seed prices are 
expected to be similar within a farm (although they may differ across farms). This suggests that 
                                                 
17  Compared to the Breusch-Pagan test, the Pagan-Hall test is a more general test for heteroscedasticity in 
an IV regression, which remains valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Pagan and Hall 1983). 






Price ($)  139410  99.61  23.61  3  230 
Farm size (acre)  30273  489.48  587.87  5  15500 
Longitude 30273  91.59 4.783 80.75  103.76 
Latitude 30273 41.71  2.010  36.71  46.98 
11 H   639 0.242  0.152  0.067  1 
22 H   639 0.769  0.188  0.337  1 
33 H   313 0.907  0.150  0.430  1 
44 H   639 0.772  0.175  0.434  1 
12 H   601 0.085  0.070  0.99E-04  0.518 
13 H   291 0.108  0.088  1.10E-03  0.632 
14 H   580 0.075  0.079  9.58E-05  0.526 
23 H   312 0.761  0.169  0.172  1 
24 H   617 0.577  0.261  0.010  1 
34 H   311 0.785  0.198  0.056  1   19
the variance of the error term in (5a) would exhibit heteroscedasticity, with clustering at the farm 
level. On that basis, we relied on heteroscedastic-robust standard errors under clustering at the 
farm level in estimating equation (5a)-(5c).   
Additional tests of the validity of the instruments were conducted.  In the presence of 
heteroscedastic errors, we used the Bound et al. (1995) measures and the Shea (1997) 
partial
2 R statistic to examine the possible presence of weak instruments. The F-statistics testing 
for weak instruments were large (i.e., much above 10). Following Staiger and Stock (1997), this 
means that there is no statistical evidence that our instruments are weak. Finally, The 
Kleibergen-Paap weak instrument test was conducted (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006),
18 yielding a 
test statistic of 5.81. Using the critical values presented in Stock and Yogo (2005), this indicated 
again that our analysis does not suffer from weak instruments.  
 
Empirical Results 
Equation 5(a)-(5c) is estimated using 2SLS, with heteroscedastic-robust standard errors under 
clustering. We first tested whether the cross-market GHHI impact is symmetric: H0: βij = βji, 
where the β’s are the coefficients of the corresponding GHHI’s. Using a Wald test, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis for 13 H . On that basis, we imposed the symmetry restriction for 13 H  in 
the analysis presented below.  
Table 3 reports the results. For comparison purpose, the ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimation results are also reported. The OLS estimates of the market concentration parameters 
differ substantially from the 2SLS results. This reflects the endogeneity of our market 
concentration measures (and its associated bias). Our discussion below focuses on the 2SLS 
                                                 
18 Note that the Kleibergen-Paap test is a better choice compared to the Cragg-Donald test for weak 
instruments: the former remains valid under heteroscedasticity (while the latter one does not).    20
estimates as IV/2SLS estimation corrects for endogeneity bias. We first discuss the price impacts 
associated with introducing single biotech traits. This builds toward a broader assessment of the 
more complex issues related to the marginal price impacts derived from the stacking of traits and 
from the role that market power has shifting rent between farmers and the seed industry.  In the 
implications section, simulations of the Illinois corn seed market provides additional insights 
about the interactive forces that derive from biotechnology.   
Characteristics effects: Compared to conventional seeds, the results show that the 
insertion of single biotech traits led to sizeable seed price premiums in three of the four traits 
considered. The coefficients of the terms  2 K  (ECB),  3 K  (RW) and  5 K  (HT2) are each positive 
and statistically significant. They are respectively $25.64, $46.06, and $9.63 per bag, suggesting 
the presence of significant premiums for these biotech traits. The coefficients of 4 K  (HT1) and 5 K  
(HT2) differ, providing evidence of differences between the two herbicide-tolerant traits HT1 
and HT2. The coefficient of 4 K  (HT1) is negative but not statistically significant. However, note 
that the K’s also appear in interaction with the H’s in (5a)-(5c).  This means that coefficients of 
the K’s alone provide only partial information on how prices vary across seed types. The 
magnitude of the price premium across seed types will be analyzed in more detail later.  
The coefficients of the terms , ij K , ijz K and  ijzr K  provide useful information on the effects 
of trait bundling on seed price. All of the stacking coefficients except for  35 K  are negative and 
statistically significant. The coefficient for  35 K  is positive but not statistically significant. As 
discussed in the econometric specifications section, component pricing is associated with the null 
hypothesis that all stacking coefficients are zero. Using a Wald test, the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of stacking effects are all zero is strongly rejected. This provides convincing 
evidence against component pricing of biotech traits in the corn seed market. The negative and   21
significant stacking effects also indicate the prevalence of subadditive pricing of corn seed in 
their individual components. Subadditive pricing may be driven by price discrimination 
associated with demand heterogeneity (higher prices being associated with more inelastic 
demands). But the fact that all of the stacking coefficients are negative indicates the likely 
presence of economies of scope in the production of bundled/stacked seeds. This would be 
consistent with synergies in R&D investment (treated as fixed cost) across stacked seeds. For 
example, a given R&D investment can contribute to the production of multiple seed types, 
meaning that bundling can help reduce the overall cost of producing seeds. In this context, the 
subadditivity of prices would reflect the fact that seed companies share with farmers at least 
some of the benefits of scope economies.   
Market concentration effects: The model incorporates market share information about 
each of the trait using the traditional Herfindahl indexes ii H along with generalized cross-
Herfindahl indexes ij H as given in equations (5a)-(5c).  Here, we discuss the partial effects of 
concentration and withhold a global assessment of market concentration until the implications 
section.
19  The partial effects of changes to the traditional Herfindahl indexes for each trait are 
presented in the first four rows of the “Market concentration effects”. In this context, our 
estimates indicate that an increase in market concentration for conventional seeds (as measured 
by 11 H ) has a positive and statistically significant association with the price of conventional 
seeds. More specifically, a one-point increase in 11 H  is associated with a $14.81 per bag increase 
in the price of conventional seeds. The partial effect of concentration in the RW trait market 
                                                 
19  We do not observe non-zero  15 H because no firm that operates in HT2 market sells a conventional 
seed.  Similar situations arise for  25, H 35 H  and  45 H . When present,  55 H =1 because only one firm 
operates in this trait market.    22
( 33 H ) and the HT1 trait market ( 44 H ), were also positive and statistically significant: A one-
point increase in  33 H  ( 44 H ) is associated with a $32 ($14.92) per bag increase in the price of RW 
(HT1) seeds.  Finally, the concentration effect in the ECB trait market is negative but not 
statistically significant.  
We have shown in the model section that the effects of cross-market 
concentration , , ij H ij ≠  depend on the substitutability/complementarity relationship between 
traits i and j. We expect that an increase in the cross-market concentration ij H will be associated 
with a rise (decrease) in the price if the two components are substitutes (complements).  
Of the five cross GHHI’s that involves conventional seed ( 12 H , 21 H , 13 H , 14 H , 41 H ), only 
the coefficients on  12 H  (conventional market share crossed with ECB market share) and  41 H  
(conventional market share crossed with HT1 market share) are statistically significant.  The 
positive effect of both coefficients suggests that the ECB trait is viewed as a substitute for the 
conventional seed from the perspective of non-GM farmers; and the conventional seed is viewed 
as a substitute for the HT1 trait for the HT1 traited seed adopters. This is plausibly explained by 
the presence of a “yield drag” associated with adding a trait into a seed (Avise 2004, p. 41), 
which would induce some substitution in demand between this trait and conventional seed.   
All the cross-market concentration effects involving biotech traits are statistically 
significant. This stresses the importance of a cross-market evaluation of market power. The ECB 
and RW cross-market effects ( 23 H  and 32 H ) are both negative. This suggests that these two IR 
traits are complements to each other.  Since these two traits are targeting the control of different 
insects, this could reflect the fact that crop damages caused by one insect infestation are larger in 
the presence of damages from another insect infestation.  The ECB and HT1 effects ( 24 H  and   23
42 H ) are both positive, suggesting that the ECB and HT1 traits are substitutes. The RW and HT1 
effects ( 34 H  and  43 H ) are statistically significant but with opposite sign, suggesting that the RW 
trait and HT1 trait may have asymmetric effects on each other: HT1 trait is viewed as 
complement to RW trait by RW traited seed adopters; and RW trait is viewed as substitute for 
HT1 trait by HT1 traited seed adopters. This indicates that the effects of insect infestation on 
corn yield differ significantly from those for weed infestation.   
Location effects: Corn seed prices are found to vary significantly across states. 
Compared to Illinois, the price difference is statistically significant for Iowa ($1.53), Indiana (-
$1.13), Ohio (-$2.16), Wisconsin (-$2.34), and Kentucky (-$3.22). This suggests that seed 
companies do price discriminate across regions, reflecting spatial differences in elasticities of 
demand for seeds. The longitude variables are not statistically significant. But the latitude 
variables have significant effects on corn seed price: the linear term is positive while the 
quadratic term is negative. This suggests that seed price rises from south to north, reaches a peak 
near the center of the Corn Belt
20 and then declines when moving further north. This confirms 
significant differences in seed prices between the center of the Corn Belt and fringe regions.  
   Purchase source effects: Recall that most farmers purchase seed from “Farmer dealer or 
agent”, followed by “Direct from seed company” , and “Myself, I am a dealer for that company” 
.  Compared to purchasing from “Farmer dealer or agent”, “buying directly from a seed 
company” costs about $4.57 less, while purchasing from “myself” costs about $4.40 less. These 
results may reflect the effect of farmer’s bargaining position, but also possibly the presence of 
price discrimination across different modes of purchase. 
 
                                                 
20 For the latitude, the peak is reached at 40.54, which is close to the center of our study region (mean 
latitude at 41.71)   24
 
Table 3.  OLS and 2SLS regression with robust standard errors,
a, b, c, d 
OLS  2SLS  Dependant Var: Price ($/bag) 
Coefficient t-statistics  Coefficient  Robust  z 
statistics 
Characteristic effects, benchmark is K1: Conventional seed 
2 K  (ECB)  24.31*** 46.93 25.64***  12.65 
3 K  (RW)  31.89*** 23.82 46.06***  5.09 
4 K  (HT1)  1.93*** 2.97 -3.78  -1.16 
5 K  (HT2)  6.92*** 18.68  9.63***  10.28 
23 K   -9.49*** -11.20  -11.20***  -7.06 
24 K   -10.06*** -30.10 -13.83***  -13.75 
25 K   -3.44*** -7.96 -5.82***  -6.00 
34 K   -11.03*** -12.74 -14.35***  -10.13 
35 K   0.39 0.33  -1.27  -0.67 
45 K   -19.70** -2.25 -21.95***  -2.92 
234 K   -24.52*** -28.17 -30.62***  -11.82 
235 K   -13.63*** -12.26 -18.71***  -6.47 
245 K   -16.51*** -24.34 -22.92***  -11.84 
345 K   -12.26*** -6.17  -17.36**  -5.98 
2345 K   -28.85*** -24.78 -37.88***  -10.05 
Market concentration effects 
11 H (conventional seed)  11.71*** 15.83 14.81***  6.47 
22 H (ECB)  1.45** 2.41  -0.57 -0.27 
33 H (RW)  4.82** 2.04  32.00***  2.93 
44 H (HT1)  11.25*** 12.70 14.92***  2.91 
12 H  on conventional seed  28.06*** 11.72 36.07***  3.10 
21 H  on ECB trait  -7.22*** -4.73 -7.29  -0.95 
13 H  on conventional seed/RW trait  -1.74 -1.00  2.78  0.21 
14 H on conventional seed  -24.19*** -9.93  -14.58  -1.04 
41 H on HT1 trait  9.22*** 6.49 22.42*  1.78 
23 H  on ECB trait  -2.10*** -6.14 -3.42**  -2.38 
32 H  on RW trait  1.79 0.74  -28.87***  -3.45 
24 H  on ECB trait  -2.58*** -5.10 3.00*  1.66   25
42 H  on HT1 trait  6.53*** 9.59 10.07***  4.17 
34 H  on RW trait  -8.41*** -4.54 -24.98***  -2.98 
43 H  on HT1 trait  3.99*** 9.35 7.77***  4.15 
Other variables 
Post-exit1 -4.36*  -1.58  -2.77  -0.59 
Pre-entry2 -5.50**  -2.21  -4.52  -1.21 
Pre-entry3 -0.30  -1.34  0.12  -0.11 
Pre-entry4 -7.75***  -3.64  -6.57**  -2.02 
Total farm corn acreage (1000 acre)  0.75***  9.61  0.72***  4.68 
Longitude 0.33***  2.90  0.37  1.49 
Longitude squared   -0.01  -1.52  -0.01  -1.00 
Latitude 0.97***  5.59  1.18***  3.30 
Latitude squared  -0.11***  -6.93  -0.13***  -4.20 
Year 2.30***  47.42  1.95***  13.95 
Constant 71.01***  71.41  70.36***  29.39 
Number of observations  123861 
a Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level. 
b The R
2 is 0.54 for the OLS estimation. For the 2SLS estimation, the centered R
2 is 0.53, and un-centered R
2 is 0.98. 
c Results for the location effects and purchase source effects are not reported here but are discussed in the text. 
d The longitude and latitude measures are normalized by subtracting the lower bound (80 for longitude and 36 for the 
latitude) from the true value. 
    
  Other variables: Most exit and entry dummies are not statistically significant. The only 
exception is Pre-entry4, which is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
introduction of HT1 traited biotech seed may raise the price for all seeds, including the 
conventional ones. This result is consistent with the finding in Shi (2009), where she argues that 
the introduction of biotech seed can raise the conventional seed price. The farm size effect is 
statistically significant: large farms within each state pay more for corn seed. This result may be 
due to the fact that large farms are more productive (compared to smaller farms) and located in 
areas where corn hybrids are better tailored to local growing conditions. The time trend effect is 
positive and statistically significant, reflecting technological improvements in the seed industry.   26
 
Implications 
In this section, our empirical estimates are used to generate insights on bundle pricing, 
and the interactive role of market power within and across markets on seed pricing. For 
illustration purpose, our analysis focuses on Illinois in 2004. Illinois is one of the largest corn-
producing states in the US, and it has the largest number of farms in our sample. The year 2004 
is chosen as it is in the middle of our sample period; and it avoids entry/exit events for traits. 
Three sets of results are presented. First, we evaluate the effects of bundling/stacking by 
simulating how stacking influences seed prices. Second, we simulate the Lerner indexes applied 
to the pricing of different seed types. This provides useful information on the extent of departure 
from marginal cost pricing. Third, in a further evaluation of market power effects, we simulate 
the potential impact of merger activities.  
 
Simulation of bundling effects 
The bundling literature has identified situations where component pricing may not apply (e.g., 
when the demands for different components are correlated, or when consumers are 
heterogeneous in at least a subset of the component markets). As discussed above, our 
econometric results strongly reject component pricing (i.e., seeds being priced as the sum of their 
component values). This raises the question: how do prices vary across bundles? To address this 
question, we simulate the effects of bundling/stacking on seed prices using mean values of 
relevant variables for Illinois in 2004 (including farm size, the traditional HHIs ( ) ii H  and the 
cross market GHHIs( ) ij H ).
21   
                                                 
21 The purchase source is set to be from “Farmer who is a dealer or agent”.   27
Table 4 contains the simulation results.
22 The simulated mean conventional seed price is 
$90.86/bag, which is presented as the base case (case 1).  Cases 2-16 involve biotech seeds, 
including stacked/bundled seeds. The last column of table 4 reports price premiums measured as 
price differences of each seed type compared to conventional seed.  Except for the seed with two 
herbicide tolerant traits (case 11: 45 K ), all biotech seed price premiums are statistically different 
from the mean conventional seed at the 1 percent level or higher.  Thus, seed companies are able 
to generate price premiums linked to specific biotech traits.   
Cases 2-5 reflect the premium attached to seeds sold with a single biotech trait. Adding 
the ECB trait  2 () K  alone raises the seed price by a premium of $17.96. The corresponding price 
premium is $29.91 for RW  3 () K , $13.03 for HT1  4 () K , and $4.51 for HT2  5 () K .  
Double, triple, and quadruple-stacked seed prices and premiums are presented in cases 6-
15.  Note first the $41.74 premium for stacking ECB and RW traits 23 () K .  While this is greater 
than the price premium farmers pay for unstacked versions of these seeds (i.e., K2 or K3), it is 
less than the sum of them (17.96 + 29.91 = $47.87). A similar pattern is evident in all the double 
stacked seed prices except for case 10: 35 K  and case 11: 45 K . The triple stacking of ECB, RW and 
HT1 traits  234 () K  has a price premium of $40.49.  This is greater than the value of any individual 
trait component or any relevant double stacked seed price (except for 23 K where the price 
difference is insignificant). But this is less than the sum of the individual premiums ($65.41). 
Note also that adding the third trait to any of the  23 K , 24 K , or  34 K  seeds produces a marginal 
contribution of the third trait that is smaller than the contribution of the trait being added into a 
                                                 
22 Note that we did not simulate the case for HT1 trait stacked with HT2 trait 45 () K because we have very 
few observations on the  45 K stacking system. The same applies for 245 K .     28
single traited system (to form a double stacking system) or alone (to form a single traited 
system). Other triple stacking systems follow a similar pattern.  Finally, the price premium for 
quadruple stacking ( 2345 K ) is $42.85, which is (weakly) greater than all other scenarios 
(including  235 K  and  345 K ). As before, the marginal contribution of each individual trait is again 
lower than in a triple system.  
Table 4. Effects of Bundling/Stacking on Seed Prices, $/bag.
a 








1     K1 (Conventional)  90.86***  0.46  0.00   
2     K2 (ECB) 108.82***  0.49  17.96***  0.65 
3     K3 (RW) 120.78***  1.28  29.91***  1.16 
4     K4 (HT1) 103.89***  0.67  13.03***  0.79 
5     K5 (HT2)  95.38***  0.67 4.51*** 0.80 
6     K23  132.60*** 1.41  41.74***  1.34 
7    K24  113.13*** 0.75  22.26***  0.88 
8    K25  112.62*** 0.59  21.76***  0.72 
9    K34  124.54*** 1.43  33.68***  1.33 
10    K35  129.11*** 1.43  38.25***  1.56 
11    K45  91.40***  7.49 0.54 7.53 
12    K234  131.35*** 1.42  40.49***  1.41 
13    K235  134.80*** 1.64  43.94***  1.64 
14    K245  113.67*** 0.90  22.81***  1.02 
15    K345  131.20*** 2.19  40.34***  2.16 
16    K2345  133.72*** 1.69  42.85***  1.74 
a Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
Overall, these results document significant departures from component pricing (where 
seeds are priced as the sum of their component values). The evidence supports sub-additive 
pricing. It shows that the marginal contribution of each component to the seed price declines 
with the number of components. Note that such a finding is consistent with the presence of 
economies of scope in seed production. Indeed, synergies in R&D investment (treated as fixed 
cost) across seed types can contribute to reducing total cost. This cost reduction can then be (at   29
least partially) shared with farmers in the form of lower seed prices. Our empirical evidence 
against component pricing and in support of sub-additive pricing could then be interpreted as 
indirect evidence of scope economies in seed production. 
 
Estimated Lerner indexes 
As discussed earlier, the Lerner index provides a simple characterization of the strength of 
imperfect competition: it is zero under marginal cost pricing, but positive when price exceeds 
marginal cost. The market power component M in equation (6) gives a per-unit measure of the 
price enhancement beyond marginal cost.  And the associated Lerner index is L =  M
p .  Evaluated 
at sample means for Illinois in 2004, the Lerner indexes (100 × L) are reported in Table 5 for 
selected seed types.   
The Lerner indexes are statistically significant at the 10 percent level in four cases (out of 
eight cases).
23 When significant, the Lerner indexes are positive in three cases (conventional 
seed 1 K , HT1 traited seed 4 K , and double stacked seed of ECB and HT1 24 K ) but negative in the 
case of  23 K  (double stacked seed of ECB and RW), with estimates of (100 × L) varying from 
5.92 percent for conventional seeds ( 1 K ) to 20.87 percent for HT1  4 () K  for the positive cases 
and -10.11 percent for ECB and RW ( 23 K ). This provides empirical evidence that market power 
affects seed prices. The effect of market power on price is found to be moderate in the 
conventional seed market 1 K , but larger in the HT1 market. Finally, the Lerner indexes are not 
statistically different from zero for  2 K  (ECB) and  3 K  (RW), but is negative and statistically 
significant in the stacked market  23 K . Thus, our analysis suggests empirical evidence of 
                                                 
23 Cases involving the  5 K  trait are dropped due to lack of variation in the  5 K market concentration.   30
complementarity interacting with market power: an increased market concentration in these two 
sub-market is associated with a price reduction in the relevant stacked seed market. 
Table 5. Simulated Lerner Indexes
a 
  Lerner Index (100 × 
L) 
Standard Error  t-ratio 
K1 (Conventional)  5.92***  1.51  3.91 
K2 (ECB) -2.44  2.05  -1.19 
K3 (RW) -8.99  6.31  -1.43 
K4 (HT1) 20.87***  2.79  7.47 
K23  -10.11** 5.02  -2.01 
K24  15.90*** 2.89  5.50 
K34  8.47 6.72 1.26 
K234  6.00 5.64 1.06 
a Lerner indexes are calculated from prices at the mean GHHI levels compared to the case of competition (GHHI=0)  
b Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
Effects of changing market structure 
In equation (3), we defined the GHHI’s
nn
ij i j n H ss
∈ ≡∑ N  for sub-markets i and j. As 
discussed above, the H’s are endogenous variables measuring market concentrations. They 
provide useful information linking market structure with pricing. The assessment of changing 
market structures is complex in the presence of bundling when the same firms sell different 
bundled goods, as all the  's ij H  typically change in response to any change in industry structure. 
The changes in the 's ij H  depend on the nature of changes in firms’ concentration in all relevant 
markets. This indicates that changes in market structure can have complex effects on prices.  
We evaluated such effects by simulating the effects of changing market structures 
associated with alternative merger scenarios. Several simulations are presented to evaluate the 
potential effects of increased market concentrations on seed prices. Each simulation considers a 
hypothetical merger in a given market, merger leading to a monopoly in that market (where the   31
post-merger market share becomes equal to 1).
24 While these are rather extreme scenarios, the 
simulated effects can be interpreted as upper bound estimates of the potential impact of market 
power. Three sets of (hypothetical) mergers are simulated: 1/ mergers between biotech 
companies within each genetic trait market (biotech/biotech within trait); 2/ mergers between 
biotech companies producing different genetic traits (biotech/biotech across traits); and 3/ 
mergers between biotech companies and seed companies (biotech/seed merger). Again, such 
merger scenarios are counterfactual. They are presented to illustrate how our analysis can be 
used to evaluate the price implications of changing market structures.  
The price effects of three sets of merger scenarios are reported in Table 6. The first set 
(scenarios 1-3) considers mergers between biotech companies within a given genetic trait market 
(biotech/biotech within trait). This covers mergers of biotech firms within the ECB market 
(scenario 1), within the RW market (scenario 2), and within the HT1 market (scenario 3). In 
scenarios 1-3, Table 6 shows that the effect of such mergers on seed price would not be 
statistically significant for ECB and RW. However, the effect is statistically significant for HT1. 
Our simulation results show that mergers of biotech firms in the HT1 markets could potentially 
induce a price increase of up to $19.08/bag of HT1 seed.  
The second set (scenarios 4-6) considers mergers between biotech companies producing 
different genetic traits (biotech/biotech across traits). This covers mergers of biotech firms 
involved in ECB and RW markets (scenario 4), in ECB and HT1 markets (scenario 5), in RW and 
HT1 markets (scenario 6). In each case, the simulations again assume that the merger leads to a 
monopoly in the corresponding market (with a market share equal to 1). Table 6 shows that the 
mergers across ECB and RW markets are associated with a price reduction of $5.99/bag for ECB 
                                                 
24 In situations where the mergers lead to increased market concentration but without full monopolization, 
note that our simulations present upper-bound estimates of the corresponding price effect.    32
seeds (scenario 4a), a price reduction of $25.10/bag for RW seeds (scenario 4b), and a price 
reduction of $31.09/bag for ECB/RW stacking seeds (scenario 4c). The results for scenario 4 
underscore the importance of possible efficiency gains that might emerge from mergers.   
Mergers involving ECB and HT1 could potentially induce a price increase of up to $22.22/bag of 
HT1 seed (scenario 5b) and $22.55/bag of ECB/HT1 stacking seeds (scenario 5c), but not on the 
ECB trait market. And mergers involving RW and HT1 could be associated with a price reduction 
of  up to $21.34/bag of RW seed (scenario 6a) and a price increase of up to $19.91/bag of HT1 
seed (scenario 6b). However, the price effects on RW/HT1 stacking seeds (scenario 6c) are not 
statistically significant.  
Finally, the third set (scenarios 7-9) considers mergers involving biotech companies and 
seed companies (biotech/seed merger). The simulations assume that the mergers lead to the 
monopolization in the corresponding biotech trait market. However, since the monopolization of 
seed companies is unlikely (there are too many seed companies), the mergers in scenarios 7-9 are 
assumed to increase market concentrations for conventional seed (as measured by the  's ii H  and 
's ij H ) only to the maximum observed in our sample. How are mergers involving both seed 
companies and biotech firms associated with changes in conventional seed prices? The simulated 
price change can be up to +$32.37/bag when mergers involve ECB biotech firms (scenario 7). 
However, our simulations indicate that the effects of such mergers would not be statistically 
significant when it involves RW biotech firms (scenario 8) or when the mergers involve HT1 
firms (scenario 9). Importantly, note that these simulation results capture cross-market effects 
contributing to the exercise of market power in the conventional seed market. These cross-
market effects play a significant role in the evaluation of the exercise of market power.     33
 

















ECB (K2) 1  ECB (K2) -1.88  2.82  -0.67 
RW (K3) 2  RW (K3) -3.37  3.21  -1.05 
HT1 (K4)  3  HT1 (K4) 19.08***  3.74  5.10 
4a  ECB (K2) -5.99**  3.01  -1.99 
4b  RW (K3) -25.10***  9.35  -2.68 
ECB and RW 
(K2, K3) 
4c  ECB/RW (K23) -31.09***  10.45  -2.97 
5a  ECB (K2) 0.33  3.33  0.10 
5b  HT1 (K4) 22.22***  4.52  4.92 
ECB and HT1 
(K2, K4) 
5c  ECB/HT1(K24)  22.55*** 6.20 3.64 
6a  RW (K3) -21.34***  6.30  -3.39 
6b  HT1 (K4) 19.91***  3.62  5.50 
RW and HT1 
(K3, K4) 
6c  RW/HT1 (K34)  -1.43 6.14  -0.23 
Conv. and ECB 
(K1, K2) 
7 Conventional (K1) 32.37***  8.93  3.62 
Conv. and RW 
(K1, K3) 
8 Conventional  (K1) 7.87  10.09  0.78 
Conv. and HT1 
(K1, K4) 
9 Conventional  (K1) -5.99  10.16  -0.59 
a Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
The simulations in Table 6 illustrate the potential usefulness of the model in studying the 
effects of changing market concentrations. For example, in a pre-merger analysis, this would 
involve evaluating the HHIs and GHHIs in all relevant markets before and after a proposed 
merger with a quantitative assessment of the price effects. Alternatively, the model could be used 
to estimate the effects of spin-offs by evaluating their anticipated effects on HHIs and GHHIs 
and by simulating the associated price changes. 
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Concluding remarks 
This paper has presented an analysis of bundle pricing under imperfect competition. A 
multiproduct Cournot model identifies the role of substitution/ complementarity in bundle 
pricing. It explains how oligopoly pricing manifests itself, and motivates generalized HHI 
measures of market concentration. The model is applied to the U.S. corn seed market and 
estimated using farm-level data from 2000-2007.  The U.S. corn seed market represents a unique 
opportunity to evaluate the pricing of bundled goods, where patented genetic traits are inserted 
into conventionally bred corn seed either bundled or independently. These GM seeds compete 
alongside conventional seeds in a spatially diverse farm sector. There is considerable variation in 
the spatial concentration of conventional seeds and seeds with various patented genetic traits. 
Through the years of this study, GM seeds have been adopted quickly among U.S. farmers and 
are part of a broader wave of technological progress impacting the agriculture sector.   
The econometric investigation documents the determinants of seed prices, including the 
effects of bundling and the pricing component associated with imperfect competition. Several 
major conclusions follow the research findings.  First, we find extensive evidence of spatial price 
discrimination. We observe, ceteris paribus, that seed prices vary by state and in a south to north 
pricing pattern that peaks in the central part of the Corn Belt.  This would be consistent with a 
type of price discrimination pattern that recognizes the inherent productivity of land in the Corn 
Belt. Second, we find strong evidence of subadditive bundle pricing, thus rejecting standard 
component pricing. This is consistent with the presence of economies of scope in seed 
production and/or demand complementarities. Third, we investigated the interactive role of 
market concentrations with complementarity/substitution effects in the pricing of seeds.  Using 
generalized HHI’s, this helps to document how traditional and cross-market effects of imperfect   35
competition can contribute to higher (or lower) seed prices. Our results indicate that Lerner 
indices for three seed types are positive and statistically significant while prices for one market 
indicate a pro-competitive environment. Fourth, our simulation of hypothetical mergers produced 
numerous interesting results. Perhaps most striking is a simulation involving a merger of 
conventional seed firm with a biotech firm selling seeds traited for ECB. Conventional seed 
prices provide an important competitive benchmark by which farmers can use to weigh the 
decision to purchase biotech seed.  The simulated merger indicates that the conventional seed 
price would rise significantly.  Such a price increase may be of great concern to policymakers 
because the impact would contribute to raising the price of the entire corn seed complex.       
Our analysis could be extended in several directions. First, it would be useful to explore 
the implications of bundle pricing and imperfect competition in vertical markets. Second, there is 
a need for empirical investigations of bundle pricing analyzed jointly with bundling decisions. 
Third, it would be useful to estimate the separate effects of supply versus demand factors in 
bundle pricing. But this would require better data (especially on the supply side) to identify these 
effects separately. Finally, there is a need to explore empirically the economics of bundling 
applied to other sectors. These appear to be good topic for further research.    36
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